Dissertatio haec circa modum quendam solvendi paradoxorum semanticorum seu “insolubilium”, ut scholastici aiunt, versatur, quem doctores mediaevales, qui “Cassantes” dici solebant, proposuerunt. Secundum Cassantium sententiam, in cuius analysi perficienda huius tractationis scopus principaliter consistit, propositiones insolubiles “nihil dicunt”; sunt enim incongruae seu male formatae, et consequenter nec veritatis nec falsitatis capabiles. Cassantes igitur solvunt insolubilia abnegando iis capacitatem veritatis ac falsitatis, quam mere apparentem esse existimant. Praesuppositum fundamentale huiusmodi doctrinae est distinctio inter logicam et grammaticam structuram propositionis, seu inter meram prolationem sententiae et actualem assertionem. Similitudo quoque notabilis apparet inter distinctionem praedictam et distinctionem inter duas conceptiones “congruentiae”, quae apud grammaticos 12. saeculi inveniuntur. Praesenti tempore sententia Cassantium ut solutio paradoxorum semanticorum in “logica illocutionum” proponi solet.

The article deals with the analysis of one medieval solution of semantic paradoxes, namely with the position of the so-called “cassantes” (i.e. “those who nullify”). The solution is based upon designating problematical sentences to be agrammatical and thus “saying nothing”: paradoxes are solved by means of deyning apparent truth-apts. Theoretically fundamental supposition of this step is drawing the distinction between grammatical and logical structure of a sentence, or (from a speech-act theoretical point of view) the distinction between a sentence and a statement. Remarkable analogies can also be shown between this distinction and the distinction between two conceptions of congruence in the twelfth-century grammar. Nowadays the cassationist approach is the solution of paradoxes proposed in the theoretical framework of the illocutionary logic.