In hac dissertatione auctor ostendit, duas vias illi, qui indolem sermonis humanae cogitando sciscitatur, pandere; quarum unam pristina, alteram serior Wittgensteinii sententia exemplificat. Sententiae vero praedictae praesertim in hoc differunt, quod in seriori mente sua Wittgenstein, ab opinione sua pristina recedens, naturam linguae nostrae neque quaerendam neque clarificandam esse putabat.

The author shows that, after some considerations about the nature of speech, we can take two substantially different paths. Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is the paradigm of the first path, his later the paradigm of the other. According the author, the difference between these two conceptions is that in his late conception (as opposed to his early view) Wittgenstein rejects the search for, and the clarification of, the essence of our language.