Aristoteles in Ethica Nicomachea (praecipue l. 1^o et 10^o) opiniones respectu beatitudinis humanae indolis exprimit, quae prima facie difficilime inter se conciliari posse videntur. Dissertatio proposita circa hanc difficultatem versatur. Auctor primo duae interpretationes sibi invicem oppositae considerat, quas vulgo “dominantismum” et “inclusivismum” vocant. Deinde ostendere conatur, relationem inter contemplationem et operationes virtuosas, quorum hae secundum inclusivismum, illa secundum dominantismum beatitudinem humanam constituit, ad modum analogiae attributionis intrinsecae intelligi debere. Cum enim et contemplatio et operationes virtuosae intrinsecam habeant bonitatem, ordinem tamen dicunt secundum prius et posterius, ut arguitur – beatitudo nempe primo contemplatione intellectiva assequitur, operationibus vero virtuosis tantum secundarie. Bonitas illa intrinseca operationum moralium, quam petimus, in hoc consistit, quod pulchrae sint et quod theoriam quodammodo approximant. Haec relatio approximationis actionum moralium ad contemplationem “teleologica” esse videtur, a relatione puri medii ad finem tamen in hoc differt, quod bonitatem intrinsecam eius quod est ad finem (seu approximantis) servat. Hoc modo operationes nostrae virtuosae et intrinsece bonae, et intrinsece ad contemplationem teleologice ordinatae esse poterunt.

The paper deals with the problem of conceptual interpretation of Aristotle’s prima facie divergent opinions on human happiness in his Nicomachean Ethics, especially in Book 1 and Book 10. As its starting point it takes the well-known expository scheme connected with the polarity “Dominantism versus Inclusivism”. It attempts to show that the relationship of two main candidates on human happines, namely the activities of moral virtues and of contemplation, should be understood on the basis of the predicative scheme called the intrinsic analogy of attribution. While both contemplation and the activities of moral virtues are intrinsically valuable, it is argued that they exhibit certain order of priority and posteriority: the theoretical activities of our intellect realise happiness primarly, whereas the moral activities merely secondarily. The desirable character of intrinsic goodness of our moral actions consists in the fact that they are beautiful and that they, in a certain way, approximate theoria. Interpreting the teleological relation between moral action and contemplation as one of approximation thus seems to represent a plausible alternative, which, unlike the standard means–end relation, keeps in balance both of the desiderata, i.e. the intrinsic goodness of our moral actions as well as their intrinsic orientation toward contemplation.