Dissertatio proposita circa varias species fatalismi versatur, quae aut super determinismum causalem, aut super principium semanticum dicens quod propositiones de futuro verae esse possint in praesenti, aut super divinam omniscientiam fundantur. Auctor formam, quae omnibus argumentis pro fatalismo est communis, manifestat et notionem modi “necessitatis impotentiae”, qui locum principalem in dictis argumentis occupat, explicat. Denique doctrinam “Occamismi”, ope cuius fatalismus theo­logicus oppugnari posset, examinat, necnon rationes alias, quibus nonnuli “principium transferendi (scil. necessitatem impotentiae)”, quo argumenta praedicta omnia sunt innixa, refutare conantur.

The paper deals with various species of fatalism originating either in causal determinism, in the semantic fact that propositions about the future may be true in the present, or in divine omniscience. The common argument form is identified as well as the relevant notion of modality at play, that of power necessity. Finally, the paper examines briefly a strategy to combat theological fatalism, the so-called Ockhamism and various attempts to disprove the underlying transfer principle (of power necessity).