Hac in tractatione auctores veritatem praemissarum argumenti ontologici, quod in dissertatione sua anno 1991 publicata proposuerunt, examinant. Auctores praesertim de prima Anselmi praemissa, qua asseritur, dari cogitabile quid, quo maius cogitari nequit, dubitant. Primo scilicet argumentum, quod Anselmus pro hac assertione astruit, reiciunt; deinde ostendunt, aliam interpretationem formalem huius praemissae dari posse, secundum quam vera evenit. Haec interpretatione adhibita, argumentum Anselmi non solum validum, sed etiam efficax esse constat. Reconstructio praecisa argumenti in hoc sensu intellecti nihilominus revelat, conclusionem eius, scilicet "Deus existit", sensum peculiarem acquirere, qui Anselmi intentioni originali haud satisfacit.

The authors evaluate the soundness of the ontological argument they developed in their 1991 paper. They focus on Anselm's first premise, which asserts that there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. After casting doubt on the argument Anselm uses in support of this premise, the authors show that there is a formal reading on which it is true. Such a reading can be used in a sound reconstruction of the argument. After this reconstruction is developed in precise detail, the authors show that the conclusion, a reading of the claim "God exists", does not quite achieve the end Anselm desired.