Disp. 50. suarum Disputationum Metaphysicorum (1597) Franciscus Suárez tres temporis notiones distinguit. Explicatio autem huius multiplicis significationis praedicati ‘quando’, quam proponit, non super definitionem temporis ab Aristotele traditam, sed super notionem durationis fundatur. Sententia Suarezii ab Aristotelis ac Aquinatis doctrina multum discrepat, quia secundum illum tempus ad numerum motus ultimae sphaerae universi Aristotelici reduci nequit. Verum nempe tempus uniuscuiusque rei nihil aliud est, secundum Suarezium, quam duratio eius intrinseca. Haec vero duratio duplici modo potest accipi: scil. aut absolute, aut relative. Duratio intrinseca absolute accepta dicit proprietatem intrinsecam rei, sua cum existentia realiter identificata, durationibus aliarum rerum haud commensurabilis. Haec intrinseca duratio potest vero et relative accipi. Hoc facimus imaginando eam, ac si certum spatium infinitae imaginariae sucessinis impleret; quae successio imaginaria est merum ens rationis. Tertius denique conceptus temporis est ille ab Aristotele definitus. Hoc est tempus mere extrinsecus, mensuratio unius motus per comparationem ad aliud motum, praesertim ad motum sphaerae ultimae. In fine auctor doctrinam Suarezii ad praecipuas sententias circa tempus recentiorum auctorum ‘analyticae’, ut aiunt, scholae comparat et valorem ingenii Doctoris Eximii manifestat.

In the fiftieth disputation of his Disputationes metaphysicae (1597), Francisco Suárez distinguishes three notions of time. Suárez offers an account of the ways in which the predicate ‘when’ can be taken and presents a more general perspective based on the principle of duration, rather than the Aristotelian definition of time. His view differs from Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ account because Suárez emphasizes that time cannot be reduced to the number of the movement of the last sphere in the Aristotelian model of the cosmos. The intrinsic duration of a thing is its true time; this duration can be taken in an absolute or a relative sense. In an absolute sense, intrinsic time is an internal property of a thing that cannot be really distinguished from existence itself and cannot be compared with other durations. In a relative sense, we can imagine this intrinsic duration as filling up a certain interval within an infinitely extended imaginary succession. This imaginary succession is an ens rationis. The third concept of time is the Aristotelian notion: this is just an extrinsic time, a measurement of one movement by means of a comparison with another movement, especially the motion of the last sphere. Finally, in order to show the value of Suárez’s insights, I compare them with some contemporary issues in the analytic philosophy of time.