| ROČNÍK 3 (2006) | ČÍSLO 1 |
THE CRITICS OF METAETHICS
IN THE WORK OF P. FOOT AND OTHER “DESCRIPTIVISTS”
Kamila Pacovská
SUMMARIUM
Doctrinae metaethicae censura,
quam P. Foot ceterique “descriptivistae” fecerunt
Dissertationis huius scopus est, efficacissimam impugnationum doctrinae, quae “metaethica” dicitur, ante oculos lectorum ponere, eam scilicet, quam Philippa Foot fecit et ab qua restauratio “ethicae substantivae” in Britannia decennio saeculi XX. sexto ad finem vergente initium duxit. Philippa Foot principium fundamentale metaethicae doctrinae, significationem nempe “aestimativam” termini a significatione mere “descriptiva” logice non dependere, redarguit. Principium istud falsum esse a Foot praesertim in exemplo significa¬tionis nominis “bonum” ostenditur. Argumenta, quibus utitur, auctor praesentis dissertionis in eiusdem capitulo secundo succincte praebet. Horum argumentorum summa reiectioni methodi “formalisticae” in ethica aequivalet.
SUMMARY
The Critics of Metaethics
in the Work of P. Foot and other “Descriptivists”
The article aims to present one of the most decisive criticisms of metaethics which resulted in the restoration of substantive ethics in Great Britain in the late fifties. Philippa Foot attacks the basic metaethical presupposition that evaluative meaning is logically independent of descriptive meaning. She concentrates on the semantics of the word “good”. The second, most extensive part of my article summarizes her argumentation for the thesis that evaluative meaning of the latter word can imply some description of the object evaluated. This result can be linked with the rejection of formalistic methods in ethics.
