Disserationis huius scopus duplex est. Primo, doctrinam de „relativitate conceptuum“ a praeclaro philosopho clarissimo Hilario Putnamio nonnullis in contextibus propositam, exponere, modumque, quo haec doctrina, secundum Putnamium, fundamenta realismi metaphysici (prout in dissertatione nostra definitur) labefactet, indicare. Secundo, examinatio argu¬menti Putnamii contra realismum metaphysicum proponitur. Auctor Putnamium nihil nisi exempla „relativitatis indexicalis“, quam vocant, praebere abitratur. Hanc vero relativitatem, ut a omnibus concessam, nullam hic probandi vim habere per se patet. Argumenta igitur Putnamii fundamenta realismi metaphysici conquasare minime videntur.

The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial, so-called indexical relativity, and that his strategy leaves the foundations of metaphysical realism intact.