In articulo de problematibus futurorum contingentium agitur sub specie logicae, i. e. utrum propositiones de futuris contingentibus aut futuribilibus sint determinate verae vel falsae. Conatur auctor ostendere, primo quomodo problema illud solvebatur saeculo XVII: a Pragensi M. Wietrowski de Societate Iesu atque ab eiusdem obloquente, Francogallo A. Goudin de Ordine praedicatorum; secundo quomodo disceptatio illa continuet in philosophia analytica contemporanea. In exordio historia problematum illustratur, i. e. ubi orta sint et quibuscum rebus nexum habeant. Porro argumenta ponderantur, quibus tunc Wietrowski et Goudin, nunc philosophi analytici J. A. Freddoso et W. L. Craig rem suam defendunt. Praesumitur ad problema solvendum necessitas decernendi, utrum futuritio causalis sit conditio necessaria necne, ut propositio de futuris contingentibus aut futuribilibus vera vel falsa aestimetur.

The article deals with the problem of the future contingents from the logical point of view, i.e. whether the propositions about (conditional) future contingents have a determinate truth-value. The author attemps to show how the problem was discussed both in the 17. century between a Prague’s Jesuit M. Větrovský and a French Dominican A. Goudin, as well as how the discussion has progressed through contemporary analytical philosophy. Firstly the history of the problem is explored to provide the sources for the discussion. Secondly the polemic of Větrovský with Goudin is examined and finally how A. J. Freddoso and W. L. Craig discuss the problem in contemporary analytical philosophy. The essential aspect of the argument is whether the propositions about (conditional) future con¬tin¬gents might have a determinate truth-value if the causal grounding (futuritio causalis) is being detached.