Finis huiusce dissertationis est, argumentationes ac discursus praecipuos, quibus Leibniz usus est ad sententiam suam stabiliendam circa „statum ontologicum“ rerum materialium (seu corporum) necnon ipsam materiam, prae oculis ponere atque analysi subicere. Duo accurate statuuntur ac explicantur: primo, duplex Leibnizii via argumentandi (viae scil., ut aiunt, „epistemica“ et „realistica“) pro thesi, quod nihil materiale, nec a fortiori ullum corpus, rigore metaphysico substantia vocari possit; secundo, propositiones ipsius, quomodo mundus materialis ex substantiis modisque sit construendus, suadentes. Speciali praeterea industria puncta cardinalia Leibnizii argumentationis indicantur et ita exprimuntur, uti facultas detur comparandi Leibnizii theses ad alias circa eandem materiam sententias praecipuas Leibnizii aetate.

The aim of this article is to present and analyze the argumentative structures which are decisive for Leibniz’s position regarding the issue of the ontological status of material things (or bodies) and matter. I reconstruct and thoroughly analyze (i) two different argumentative strategies of Leibniz’s – viz. an “epistemic” and a “realistic” one – for his general thesis that nothing material (and a fortiori no body) has rigore metaphysico the status of a substance, as well as (ii) the corresponding suggestions of his as to how the material world is to be construed out of substances and their modes. Throughout, I lay special emphasis on pinpointing the real key elements of Leibniz’s arguments and on articulating them in such terms that would allow for their direct confrontation with other paradigmatic positions regarding the issue in Leibniz’s times.