Saul Kripke nominis proprii suppositionem (a recentibus "reference" dictam) per "sensum" quemlibet (intensionem, conceptum) mediatam esse negat, eam propter eius "rigiditatem" immediatam esse docet suamque sententiam nonnullis argumentis defendit. Doctrina vero, quae praedicationem ut identificationem conceptus praedicati cum re per conceptum subiecti repraesentatam concipit ("doctrina identificationis"), sine conceptibus (sensu terminorum) stare nequit. Nostra in dissertatione doctrina quaedam proponitur, in qua, "doctrina identificationis" supposita, argumenta Kripke conatur solvere, salvando tamen nominum "rigiditatem". Duo asseruntur: Primo: utrum suppositio terminis sit de re ("rigida") an de dicto ("non rigida"), hoc non ex natura termini singularis (scil. utrum sit nomen proprium an descriptio determinata), sed ex intentione auctoris propositionis provenire: nihil ergo obstat quin et nomina et descriptiones et de re et de dicto supponere possint. Secundo: dari "sensum minimalem" nominis proprii e.g. N, qui ita describi potest: "ille cui nomen N impositum est". Verbis "nomen impositum est" relatio quaedam rationis exprimitur; haec a relatione suppositionis (quae mediatur per nominis sensum) stricte distinguenda est, ne in determinanda suppositione in circulum vitiosum incidatur.

Saul Kripke denies that the reference of a proper name is mediated through a sense (an intension, a concept), and claims that it has to be immediate for "rigidity" of a proper name to be saved. On the other hand, the version of the Identity Theory of predication according to which predication is characterised as intentional identification of the conceptual content of the predicate with the object represented by the subject-concept requires that there be a concept (sense of the term) at the places both of the subject and of the predicate. This paper is an attempt to propose a conception that purports to maintain the Identity Theory of predication with its demand for proper names to have senses and respond to Kripkean arguments while retaining the rigidity of proper names. Two main theses are defended: 1) Whether a term refers rigidly or non-rigidly does not depend on the nature of the term (i. e. whether it is a name or a description), but on the intention of the speaker/writer. Consequently, both names and descriptions can be used both rigidly and non-rigidly. 2) There is a "minimal sense" to any proper name which can generaly be described as follows: "the person who has been given the name so-and-so". The expression "has been given the name" describes a "relation of reason", which must be strictly distinguished from the relation of reference of the name, in order to avoid a vicious circle in refernce determination, something against which Kripke warned.