Problema cognitionis individui qua talis, scil. quoad eius individualitatem ("principii individuationis") ad multas disceptationes ansam praebuit. In lumine revelationis Christianae quidem quaestio haec immo vehementius urget, nam fides Christiana primo singularia et individualia (et ideo contingentia) ante oculos ponit, universalia vero mere secundarie respicit. Ioannes Duns Scotus quaestionem hanc theologico-philosophicam tractans cognitionem intuitivam intellectivam totius rei individualis defendit, tria genera talis cognitionis distinguendo: primo cognitionem intuitivam intellectivam perfectam, quae non est possibilis nisi "in patria", secundo cognitionem intuitivam intellectivam directam sed imperfectam (scil. ad principium individuationis cognoscendum non penetrantem) quae veritates contingentes actusque animae respicit, tertio cognitionem intuitivam intellectivam imperfectam et indirectam - actus commemorandi cognitiones intuitivas praeteritas. Ex his tribus intuitivae cognitionis modis, quomodo Scotus Aristotelis de cognitione doctrinam mutaverit, elucet.

The problem of the intuition of the individual as such, i. e. of its individuality (the "principle of individuation") gave rise to many controversies. The problem becomes especially urgent in the light of the Christian revelation, since Christianity in the ?rst place relates to the singular and individual (and therefore contingent), whereas the universal assumes only a secondary rôle. John Duns Scotus deals with this theologico-philosophical problem and sets out to defend intellective intuition of the individual as a whole. He distinguishes three kinds within this type of cognition: perfect intuitive intellective cognition which is possible only in patria, direct but imperfect (i. e. not penetrating the principle of individuation) intuitive intellective cognition which relates to contingent truths and spiritual acts, and, finally, imperfect and indirect intuitive intellective cognition, i. e. acts of recalling the past intuitive cognitions. In these three examples the fundamental Scotus's arguments are exhibited and the extent to which Scotus transgresses the limits of Aristotelian epistemology is made clear.